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I. OVERVIEw
The organisers of  the Regensburg conference entrust me with the 
task of  giving an overview of  judicial independence, court specialization 
and efficiency in the Italian legal system, with a view to contributing to the 
debate on common European minimum standards for courts.1
According to this proposal, the following items will be covered. 
First of  all, I will examine efficiency, namely: (a)drafting a principle of  
efficiency of  civil procedure, fit to capture the structure and purpose of  
judicial systems, with a view to proposing a draft principle as a contribu-
tion to the discussion about common European minimum standards; (b) 
assessing the regulative impact that the principle of  efficiency could have 
on certain problems and trends, in particular the current situation of  the 
Italian Supreme Court and its task of  ensuring the uniform application 
of  law. Turning to judicial independence, attention will be focused on 
the institutional and procedural devices designed to ensure judicial inde-
pendence in the Italian legal system, with a view to assessing, in a subse-
quent article, relationships and tensions between judicial independence 
and the use of  tools for improving the performance of  judicial systems 
(e.g. performance targets). Finally, the topic of  court specialization will be 
examined. By contrast, a detailed treatment of  the achievement of  these 
standards insofar as they obtain to Italian ADR bodies will remain for 
another day.
1 C. Althammer, Mindeststandards im Zivilprozess, ZZP 126 (2013), p. 3 ff.; M. Weller, C. Althammer (Hrsg.), Mindeststan-
dards im Europäischen Zivilprozessrecht, Mohr Siebeck, 2015.
 R. EMERJ, Rio de Janeiro, v. 21, n. 2, p. 11-39, Maio-Agosto, 2019 12 
II. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: DEVICES FOR EN-
SURING QUALITy PERFORMANCE
A session of  the conference has been devoted to alternative dispute 
resolution methods. In this framework it would have been no doubt of  
interest to address the standards of  independence, specialisation and effi-
ciency of  Italian ADR bodies, taking into account the recent implementa-
tion in Italy of  the ADR Directive(2013/11/EU).2 However, it would not 
be feasible to ad equately deal with ADR bodies in this report.
Apart from ordinary time constraints, there is another reason why 
it is inadvisable to examine ADR bodies. In effect, the most important 
indicators for assessing the quality performance of  alternative dispute 
methods are fully external to ADR bodies and connected with the legal 
system taken as a whole, that is:
(a) Ensuring that dispute resolution methods are chosen by the par-
ties in a truly free and informed way;
(b) Making sure that the judicial protection of  rights is effective, 
in order to prevent the risk of  unequal bargaining power between the 
parties giving rise to instances of  unjust settlements, due to the lack of  a 
viable alternative before the courts. This holds true particularly in the field 
of  consumer protection in Europe, since a system of  dispute resolution 
which is developing its own institutional structure independent from the 
court system is arising in this field.
To cut a long story short: addressing key features of  a judicial sys-
tem such as independence (and specialisation) of  courts as well as its over-
all performance is an indicator for understanding the effective role played 
by ADR bodies in that system.3
III. DRAFTING A PRINCIPLE OF EFFICIENCy OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE
1. Opening Questions
When attempting to draft a principle of  efficiency with regard to 
the performance of  civil justice systems, it is prudent to consider whether:
2 Cf. Decreto legislativo 6 August 2015, no. 130, at www.normattiva.it.
3 For further remarks cf. R. Caponi, “Just Settlement” or “Just About Settlement”? Me diated Agreements: a Comparative 
Overview of  the Basics, Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, 2015, p. 117 ff.
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(a) Introducing a principle of  efficiency of  civil procedure should 
be regarded as undesirable, because it could serve as a point of  entry for 
neoliberal market ideology, particularly the “doing business” approach, 
into the administration of  civil justice;4
(b) The reference to efficiency is really necessary, as efficiency could 
be seen as a facet of  the wider claim to the effectiveness of  judicial protec-
tion of  rights;
(c) If  a principle of  efficiency of  civil procedure ought to be intro-
duced into the legal system, what wording is to be adopted and subject to 
such wording what practical consequences are to be expected?
2. Efficiency or Effectiveness?
The most sustained objections against incorporating a principle of  
efficiency of  civil procedure arise from the fear that such codification 
could be the point of  entry into the legal system for neoliberal market 
ideology, which aims to subordinate the judicial protection of  rights to a 
profit maximising and cost minimising approach, with a view to optimal 
resource allocation. This argument usually includes a more general objec-
tion to the U.S. Law & Economics movement.
Judicial protection of  rights and efficiency (for the purpose of  wel-
fare economics: wealth maximization), however, do not appear mutually 
incompatible. As Steven Shavell states:
“According to the framework of  welfare economics, social welfare 
is assumed to be a function of  individuals’ well being, thatis, of  their utili-
ties. An individual’s utility, in turn, can depend on anything about which 
the individual cares: not only material wants, but also, for example, a es-
thetic tastes, altruistic feelings, or a desire for notions of  fairness to be 
satisfied. Hence, social welfare can depend on any of  these elements, and 
will depend on them to the extent that individuals’ utilities do. It is thus 
a mistake to believe that, under the economic view, social welfare reflects 
only narrowly ‘economic’ factors, namely the amount of  goods and ser-
vices to be produced and enjoyed”.5
4 Cf. R. Stürner, Die Rolle des dogmatischen Denkens im Zivilprozessrecht, Zeitschrift für Zivilprozess, ZZP 127 (2014), 
p. 271 ff., p. 310 ff.; A. Bruns, Der Zivilprozess zwischen Rechtsschutzgewährleistung und Effizienz, Zeitschrift für Zivil-
prozess, ZZP 124 (2011), p. 29 ff.
5 S. Shavell, Foundations of  Economic Analysis of  Law, Harvard University Press, 2004, p. 2; G. Calabresi, The future of  
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If  one maintained that judicial protection of  rights and efficiency 
are incompatible, one would be bound to believe that individuals do not 
care about judicial protection of  rights (except when they are party to civil 
proceedings).
The real problem is finding a way to determine how much individuals 
value judicial protection of  rights in comparison with other goods and 
services they want to obtain and, accordingly, how many resources they 
wish to devote to the judicial system in comparison with other sectors of  
public administration.
This is for the political process to decide.
3. Efficiency and Procedural Economy
A further objection is that a principle of  efficiency is unnecessary, 
since efficiency is merely a facet of  the effectiveness of  judicial protection 
of  rights.6 This objection seems to identify the principle of  efficiency with 
the principle of  procedural economy.
Yet, there is a difference between the efficiency and effectiveness, as 
the principle of  efficiency is connected with the purposes and arrangements 
of  the whole civil justice system, while the principle of  procedural economy 
is rather linked to the purpose(s) of  single proceedings, by claiming that 
such purposes be achieved in the most costefficient way.7
4. Efficiency of  Civil Procedure: Draft Principle
The principle of  efficiency of  civil procedure should be designed 
as a procedural principle that can build a bridge between the regulation 
and management of  single civil proceedings (or discrete classes thereof) 
and the systemic management of  the mass of  civil proceedings, through 
the organisation and direction of  services connected with the administra-
tion of  justice. In other words, it is advisable to develop such a principle 
as a guide for the legislator to perform a balancing exercise between the 
protection of  plaintiffs’ and defendants’ interests in the fair regulation of  
the single dispute wherein they are involved and the citizens’ interests in 
Law and Economics. Essays Reform and Recollection, Yale University Press, 2016.
6 For a brief  discussion on this point, cf. H. Schulze-Fielitz/C. Schütz, Justiz und Justizverwaltung zwischen Ökonomisie-
rungsdruck und Unabhängigkeit, Duncker und Humblot, 2002, p. 14.
7  Cf. A. Bruns, Der Zivilprozess zwischen Rechtsschutzgewährleistung und Effizienz, p. 29 ff., p. 31 f.
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the efficient management of  the mass of  civil proceedings, i.e., the overall 
performance of  the civil justice system, as they may well be users of  that 
system in the future.8
By exploring avenues for drafting a principle of  efficiency in this 
field, take as a starting point a very simple definition of  efficiency, drawn 
from economics and also acknowledged by legal scholarship.9 It concerns 
the ratio of  the work done by a system relative to the resources supplied 
to it. It is a purely formal definition, lacking any substantive content. What 
is the point or what is the aim to be pursued by an efficient allocation of  
resources in the field of  civil justice? I suggest that this aim be identified 
with the purposes of  the civil justice system as such. Therefore, a principle 
of  efficiency in civil justice could be tentatively drafted as follows:
“Access to the courts and effective protection of  rights in a fair 
process should be provided by the law in an efficient way, allotting to 
each case an appropriate share of  the court’s resources, while taking into 
account the need to allot resources to other cases”.
It should be no secret that the second part of  this formulation 
(“allotting…”) heavily draws upon Rule 1.1. (e) English and Welsh CPR. 
I had the opportunity to suggest a similar wording in the course of  the 
preparatory work for a new code of  civil procedure in Italy, drafted by 
Andrea Proto Pisani some years ago.10 Under the heading “Efficiency of  
civil procedure”, the provision 0.8 of  Proto Pisani’s draft reads in Italian 
as follows:
“È assicurato un impiego proporzionato delle risorse giudiziali ris-
petto allo scopo della giusta composizione della controversia entro un ter-
mine ragionevole, tenendo conto della necessità di riservare risorse agli 
altri processi”.
An alternative formulation (less elegant, but underlining the pri-
macy of  access to the court and effectiveness) could be:
“The pursuit of  efficiency shall not be detrimental to the right of  
access to courts and the effective protection of  rights”.
8 For further remarks on this aspect and practical examples, s. R. Caponi, Il principio di proporzionalità nella giustizia 
civile: prime note sistematiche, Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile, 2010, p. 389ff.
9 W. Hoffmann-Riem, E. Schmidt-Aßmann, Effizienz als Herausforderung an das Verwaltungsrecht, Nomos, 1998, p. 246.
10 Cf. A. Proto Pisani, Per un nuovo codice di procedura civile, Foro it., 2009, V, c. 1 ff.
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5. Certain Practical Consequences in the Italian Experience
By examining the Italian experience one can explore the practical 
consequences of  this approach. Currently, a principle of  efficiency con-
cerning civil procedure is not explicitly provided for in the Italian legal sys-
tem. It is derived, however, by way of  creative interpretation from the prin-
ciple of  reasonable duration of  civil proceedings, which was introduced in 
1999 in Art. 111, para 2 Const. to ensure Italian law complies with Art. 6 
of  the European Convention of  Human Rights.11 Alaw is required forthis 
constitutional provision to be implemented.12 However, some very ques-
tionable decisions by the Supreme Court (Corte di cassazione) in the last 
decade have disregarded statutory provisions of  the Code of  Civil Proce-
dure that are clearly applicable in relevant cases, but allegedly at odds with 
the constitutional principle of  reasonable duration.13 Abalanced constitu-
tional provision on the efficiency of  civil procedure would possibly have 
dissuaded the Supreme Court from is suing such counter intuitive rulings.
In an article published some years ago in an Italian law journal,14 
I pinpointed a number of  ways the legislator could take into account the 
principle of  efficiency of  civil procedure in certain areas, ranging from 
ADR to partial claims, the structure of  proceedings, class actions, access 
to the Supreme Court, res judicata, and so on.
6. Filtering the Access to the Corte di cassazione
Among the topics listed at the end of  last paragraph, the heavy 
workload of  the Corte di cassazione has been a serious problem for a num-
ber of  decades. The Italian Supreme Court decides cases in civil and crimi-
nal matters, andischarged with the task of  reviewing appellate judgments 
11 Cf. Constitutional Law no. 2 of  1999. For this interpretation, s. A. Proto Pisani, Il nuovo art. 111 Cost. e il giusto 
processo civile, Foro italiano, 2000, V, c. 241 ff.; R. Caponi, Il principio di proporzionalità nella giustizia civile: prime note 
sistematiche, p. 398.
12 Art. 111, para 2 Const.: “The law provides for the reasonable duration” of  proceedings.
13 Cf., among others, Cass. 9 October 2008, no. 24883; Cass. 23 February 2010, no. 4309; Cass. 30 July 2008, no. 20604. 
14 R. Caponi, Il principio di proporzionalità nella giustizia civile: prime note sistematiche.
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on points of  law15 and ensuring “the exact observance and the uniform 
interpretation of  the law”16.
The Italian Constitution provides for a right to review by the Corte 
di cassazione on grounds of  violation of  law.17 Due to the extensive use of  
this guarantee, the number of  appeals to the Corte di cassazione has increased 
dramatically in the last decades. Just over 3,000 appeals were submitted an-
nually during the 1960s. In the 1980s the number had grown to more than 
10,000 in civil cases only.18 In 2013, there were 29,091 civil cases lodged to 
the Court for review. In the same year the Court disposed of  30,179 civil 
cases. At the end of  the year there were 98,690 civil cases pending.19
One can ascertain the clearance rate concerning the Supreme Court 
for 2013. This performance indicator can be used to see if  the courts are 
keeping up to date with the number of  incoming cases without increasing 
their backlog.20 The clearance rate, expressed as a percentage, is obtained 
when the number of  resolved cases is divided by the number of  incom-
ing cases and the result is multiplied by 100. In 2013, the clearance rate 
amounted to 103, the Corte di cassazione is thus decreasing its backlog.
Apart from the clearance rate indicator – following the CEPEJ ap-
proach – the disposition time indicator can provide further insight into 
how the Supreme Court manages its flow of  cases. This indicator, ex-
pressed as a timeframe in days, is obtained when the number of  unre-
solved cases at the end of  a period (normally a year) is divided by the 
number of  resolved cases in the same period and the result is multiplied 
15 Cf. Art. 360 c.p.c. (Code of  Civil Procedure). Cf. M. De Cristofaro, N. Trocker (eds.), Civil Justice in Italy, Nagoya Uni-
versity Comparative Study of  Civil Justice, 2010, p. 24 ff.
16 Art. 65 r.d. no. 12 of  1941 (Law on judicial organisation, ordinamento giudiziario).
17 Cf. Art. 111, para 7 Const.
18 Cf. M. De Cristofaro, N. Trocker (eds.), Civil Justice in Italy, p. 26, Footnote no. 24.
19 Cf. Ministero della giustizia, Piano della performance 2015–2017, www.giustizia.it, p. 15.
20 Cf. CEPEJ, Report on European Judicial Systems – Edition 2014 (2012 Data): Efficiency and Quality of  Justice, www.
coe.int, p. 190: “A clearance rate close to 100 % indicates the ability of  the court or of  a judicial system to resolve more or 
less as many cases as the number of  incoming cases within the given time period. A clearance rate above 100 % indicates 
the ability of  the system to resolve more cases than received, thus reducing any potential backlog. Finally, if  the number 
of  incoming cases is higher than the number of  resolved cases, the clearance rate will fall below 100 %. When a clearance 
rate goes below 100 %, the number of  unresolved cases at the end of  a reporting period (backlog) will rise”.
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by 365 (days)21. According to this formula22, in 2013 the disposition time 
by the Supreme Courts amounted to slightly more than three years and 
three months (1,193days).
These indicators (in particular the latter) are of  limited value, how-
ever, as they can only give an overview of  the average duration of  cases; 
they fail to take into account the moment in which the appeal has been 
lodged, as well as the validity, contents, and complexity of  the cases. They 
fail, thus, to differentiate the flow of  cases into discrete classes and to 
determine the real duration of  the cases accordingly. By way of  example, 
consider the average duration in 2013 (1,193 days), which was about an 
18% increase in comparison to 2012.23 At first sight, one might think that 
this increase in the average duration of  litigation is a sign of  a worsening 
of  the situation. Quite the opposite holds true, as the increase was a result 
of  successful efforts to tackle the backlog of  cases. In fact, the greater the 
number of  preexisting proceedings the Court disposes of  in a given time 
span, the more the average length of  resolved cases will increase in the 
same period24, but of  course this will be a temporary increase.
Court delays are not the only consequence of  the heavy workload 
and the flood of  applications. The large numbers of  decisions requires a 
large number of  judges: in 2013 there were 121 civil judges who decided 
approximately 240 cases per capita25: subtracting 30 days of  holidays and 
52 weekends from 365 day, each judge of  the Supreme Court writes slightly 
21 Cf. CEPEJ, Report on European Judicial Systems, p. 190 f.: “A case turnover ratio and a disposition time indicator pro-
vide further insight into how a judicial system manages its flow of  cases. Generally, a case turnover ratio and disposition 
time compares the number of  resolved cases during the observed period and the number of  unresolved cases at the end 
of  the observed period. The ratios measure how quickly a judicial system (or a court) ‘turns over’ the cases received – that 
is, how long it takes for a type of  case to be resolved. The relationship between the number of  cases that are resolved 
during an observed period and the number of  unresolved cases at the end of  the period can be expressed in two ways. The 
first measures the share of  resolved cases from the same category in the remaining backlog […].The second possibility, 
which relies on the first data, determines the number of  days necessary for a pending case to be solved in court. This 
prospective indicator […] is an indicator of  timeframe, more precisely of  disposition time, which is calculated by dividing 
365 days in a year by the case turnover ratio […]. It needs to be mentioned that this ratio does not provide a clear estimate 
of  the average time needed to process each case”.
22 A slightly different formula used to calculate delay is (C1 + C2) : (E + U) = g. C1 is the number of  proceedings pending 
at the beginning of  a period (normally, a year), C2 is the number of  proceedings pending at the beginning of  the following 
period, E is the number of  cases filed during the year, U is the number of  cases disposed of  during the year, and finally g 
is the average duration in years and fractions of  years.
23 Ministero della giustizia, Piano della performance 2015–2017, p. 15.
24 Cf. Corte suprema di cassazione, Relazione sull’amministrazione della giustizia nell’anno 2013, www.cortedicassazione.
it, p. 60.
25 Cf. Corte suprema di cassazione, Relazione sull’amministrazione della giustizia nell’anno 2014, p. 61.
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more than one text of  decision per day. Thus, conflicting judgments are 
unavoidable and, as such, the Corte di cassazione has been for decades 
unable to guarantee the consistency and predictability of  its decisions, 
which makes the uniform interpretation of  the law a difficult task to be 
achieved:26 “Instead, the court has become a sort of  judicial supermarket, 
wherein lawyers can often be sure to find any precedent they need to 
plead the case of  their client”27, which increases legal uncertainty and the 
litigation rate in the Italian legal system.
In the last decade some “internal” procedural devices were intro-
duced to reduce the workload of  the Court with modest results.28 The 
best solution to tackle this problem would be to filter access to the Court 
in order to reduce the number of  appeals only to those having a great 
significance, analogous to how access to the German Supreme Court is 
regulated. This reform proposal is strongly opposed by the bar, on the 
basis that the constitutional right to review by the Corte di cassazione implies 
an unrestricted access to the courts up to the Supreme Court.
A constitutional principle of  efficiency of  civil procedure would 
allow the legislator to introduce a filter to the Corte di cassazione, such as 
to balance access to the courts with the need to concentrate resources for 
the Corte di cassazione to better perform its task of  ensuring uniform ap-
plication of  the law.29
IV. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: INSTITUTIONAL AND PRO-
CEDURAL DEVICES
1. Introductory Remarks
Judicial independence is a major principle of  civil procedure world-
26 Cf. M. De Cristofaro, N. Trocker (eds.), Civil Justice in Italy, p. 26.
27 S. Chiarloni, Civil Justice and its Paradoxes: An Italian Perspective, in A.A.S. Zuckerman, S. Chiarloni, P. Gottwald 
(eds.), Civil Justice in Crisis. Comparative Perspectives of  Civil Procedure, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 263 ff., p. 267.
28 Cf. from the newest: reform of  the Art. 360, n. 5 c.p.c. (L. no. 134 of  2012); Art. 360bis c.p.c. (L. no. 69 of  2009, also 
introducing the Sixth Section “Filter”); Art. 366bis c.p.c. (introducing in 2006 a new requirement of  the application for 
review, the so called quesito di diritto, query on point of  law, abolished in 2009); Art. 375, 380bis, 380ter c.p.c. (L. No. 89 of  
2001, regulating an accelerated proceedings, procedimento in camera di consiglio).
29 Pointing in that direction cf. the results of  the General Assembly of  the Supreme Court, held in June 2015, suggesting 
to Parliament and government to amend Art. 111 Const., limiting the admissibility of  appeals to the Corte di cassazione in 
civil matters to cases in which this is needed in order to formulate “legal principles of  general validity”, www.cortedicas 
sazione.it.
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wide.30 The Principles of  Transnational Civil Procedure, as adopted by the 
American Law Institute and Unidroit in 2004, provide:
“The court and the judges should have judicial independence to 
decide the dispute according to the facts and the law, including freedom 
from improper internal and external influence”.31
Promoting judicial independence requires, of  course, the com-
plementarity and the interplay between different substantive elements: 
recruitment, tenures, salaries, discipline, immunity, physical security, 
administrative autonomy, training, and so on.32 First of  all, however, 
judicial independence requires that certain institutional and procedural 
devices are adopted; that is, bodies and proceedings in charge of  ensuring 
its realisation and able to react against violation and interference by other 
(public and private) entities.
In Europe, a great divide exists between legal systems in which ju-
dicial independence is ensured through a high council of  the judiciary, 
such as in the Italian, and those in which it is not, such as in the German 
legal system.33 In the last decades, the trend is towards an expansion of  
the high council system34. The Italian High Council of  the Judiciary (Con-
siglio Superiore della Magistratura, the ‘CSM’), one of  the oldest councils for 
the judiciary in Europe (it was established by Art. 104 Const. and began 
functioning in 1958),35 has played a leading role in this trend. It is a model 
for developing independent judicial councils across Europe and has taken 
part in “twinning projects”36 that support high councils for the judiciary in 
30 Cf. e.g. S. Shetreet, J. Deschênes (eds.), Judicial Independence, The Contemporary Debate, M. Nijhoff, 1985; S.B. Burbank, 
B. Friedman (eds.), Judicial Independence at the Crossroads, An Interdisciplinary Approach, Sage Publications, 2002; 
A. Seibert-Fohr, L.F. Müller (eds.), Judicial Independence in Transition, Springer, 2012.
31 Cf. Ali/Unidroit Principle no. 1.1. Cf. also Art. 6, para 1 European Convention of  Human Rights; Art. 47 Charter of  
Fundamental Rights of  the European Union.
32 V.C. Jackson, Judicial Independence: Structure, Context, Attitude, A. Seibert Fohr, L.F. Müller (eds.), Judicial Indepen-
dence in Transition, Springer, 2012, p. 19 ff.
33 Cf. European Network of  Council for the Judiciary, ENCJ, www.encj.eu.
34 Cf. B. Hess, G. Dimitropoulos (eds.), Judicial Reforms in Luxembourg and Europe, Nomos, 2014.
35 In the Italian legal system, a Superior Council of  the Judiciary was first established by a law of  1907, but it was merely a 
consultative body to the Minister of  Justice, who had the ultimate say in matters of  the recruitment, assignment, transfer, 
promotion and disciplinary measures affecting judges and prosecutors. One year later a disciplinary court was established. 
Cf. R. Caponi, Judicial Independence in Italy – The Role of  the Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura, B. Hess, G. Dimi-
tropoulos (eds.), Judicial Reforms in Luxembourg and Europe, Nomos, 2014, p. 135ff.
36 Twinning projects are one of  the tools introduced by the European Union within the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) to strengthen relations between the European Union and its neighbours.
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eastern European countries (such as Albania and Romania). Furthermore, 
the Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura played a major role in creating the Eu-
ropean Judicial Training Network (EJTN), which was founded in 2000. It 
is the main association for the exchange of  knowledge and competence in 
the field of  the judiciary in Europe,37 as well as the European Network of  
Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ), established in 2004 in Rome.38
2. Constitutional Framework of  Judicial Independence
As to the Italian legal framework, key aspects concerning judicial 
independence of  ordinary courts are found in the Italian Constitution of  
1948.39 The former basic law, the Statuto Albertino of  194840, adopted the 
Napoleonic pattern, with the Judiciary placed within a structure headed by 
the Minister of  Justice.41 The Fascist regime simply reinforced the already 
existing structure. After World War II and the fall of  the fascist regime, the 
Constitution assigned the courts a central role within the new democratic 
regime. The independence of  magistrates (judges and prosecutors)42 was 
assured by the introduction of  remarkable changes in the traditional orga-
nization of  the judicial function.
Fundamental provisions of  the Constitution on this matter are: 
Justice shall be “administered in the name of  the people”;43 judges shall 
be “subject only to the law”;44 the judiciary shall act as an autonomous 
order, independent of  any other power;45 magistrates shall be appointed 
37 Cf. www.ejtn.net. For further information, s. R. Caponi, Judicial Independence in Italy – The Role of  the Consiglio 
Superiore della Magistratura, p. 135 ff.
38 Cf. www.encj.eu.
39 Cf.  Art. 101–110, within  Part  II,  dealing  with the organisation  of  the Republic. Cf. M.A. Livingston, P.G. Monateri, 
F. Parisi, M. Cappelletti, The Italian Legal System. An Introduction, 2nd ed., Stanford University Press, 2015, p. 72 ff.; M. De 
Cristofaro, N. Trocker (eds.), Civil Justice in Italy, p. 19 ff.; O.G. Chase, E. Hershkoff, L. Silberman, Y. Taniguchi, V. Varano, A. 
Zuckerman (eds.), Civil Litigation in Comparative Context, Thomson West, 2007, p. 82 ff., p. 122 ff.
40 The Statuto Albertino was the constitution that Charles Albert of  Sardinia conceded to the Kingdom of  Sardinia in Italy 
in 1848. The Statute in 1861 became the fundamental charter of  the unified Kingdom of  Italy and remained in force, 
with amendments, until 1948.
41 Art. 68 Statuto Albertino stated that “justice emanates from the King and is administ ered by the magistrates whom he 
appoints”.
42 In the Italian language (and legal terminology) the term “Magistrate” is used to indicate both judges and public pro-
secutors.
43 Art. 101, para 1 Const.
44Art. 101, para 2 Const.
45 Art. 104, para 1 Const. In comparison with the German legal system, it is worth mentioning that the Constitutional 
Court (Corte costituzionale), vested with the authority to act as guardian of  the Constitution, is not a branch of  the judiciary. 
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by competition,46 performed through written and oral examinations;47 
they shall be differentiated only by the diversity of  their functions;48 as a 
rule, they may not be removed from office or assigned to other courts or 
functions.49
3. High Council of  the Judiciary at a Glance
The High Council of  the Judiciary plays a key role in ensuring 
the independence of  career magistrates in ordinary courts (judges and 
prosecutors). Apart from the power of  initiating disciplinary proceedings, 
the Ministry of  Justice has no decisional powers in governing the judiciary. 
Moreover, the Ministry has responsibility only for “the organisation and 
direction of  all services connected with the administration of  justice”, 
“except for matters within the competence of  the High Council of  the 
Judiciary”.50 To put it bluntly, it is the Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura 
that is in charge of  governing the judiciary and protecting judicial 
independence.51 The system of  self  governance of  the judiciary also 
includes judicial councils (consigli giudiziari) sitting in the courts of  appeal, 
which perform an advisory function in all the decisions of  the CSM 
regarding the status of  judges and prosecutors working in their respective 
areas of  territorial competence.52
4. Composition of  the High Council
Two thirds of  the CSM members are magistrates elected by their 
colleagues. One third of  the members are drawn from among law profes-
sors and lawyers with at least 15 years of  professional experience and are 
elected by the Parliament by a qualified majority, there by guaranteeing the 
As to the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the solution in the German legal system is the opposite (Art. 92 GG). The judges of  the 
Corte costituzionale are chosen by Parliament (5 judges), Head of  State (5), Supreme Court (3), Council of  State (1), Court 
of  Accounts (1). Cf. M. De Cristofaro, N. Trocker (eds.), Civil Justice in Italy, p. 29 ff.
46 Art. 106, para 1 Const.
47 Law no. 48 of  2001.
48 Art. 107, para 4 Const.
49 Art. 107, para 1 Const.
50 Cf. Art. 110 Const.
51 Cf. G. Di Federico, Judicial Independence in Italy, A. Seibert Fohr, L.F. Müller (eds.), Judicial Independence in Transition, 
Springer, 2012, p. 357 ff., p. 397. Di Federico’s paper is a major contribution on this topic.
52 Cf. Law no. 111 of  2007.
23 R. EMERJ, Rio de Janeiro, v. 21, n. 2, p. 11-39, Maio-Agosto, 2019 
representation of  parliamentary minorities.53 The CSM is presided over by 
the President of  the Republic, who however rarely attends its meetings. 
The main functions of  leadership, therefore, are performed by the Vice 
President, elected from among the members designated by the Parliament. 
Besides the President of  the Republic, the CSM includes two other ex of-
ficio members: the President of  the Supreme Court of  Cassation and the 
General Prosecutor of  the Supreme Court of  Cassation. At present, the 
CSM is composed of  27 members. In addition to the three ex officio mem-
bers, 8 members are elected by Parliament and 16 by magistrates. All 24 
elected members are renewed in toto every four years and their appoint-
ment cannot be renewed in the successive four years.54
5. Expansion of  Powers of  the High Council
The purpose of  ensuring judicial independence has come to shape 
every aspect of  the governance of  the judiciary in Italy and promotes an 
impressive expansion of  the tasks of  the High Council of  the Judiciary, 
beyond the wording of  Art. 105 of  the Italian Constitution, which entrusts 
the CSM with recruitments, assignments and reassignments, promotions 
and disciplinary measures with regards to judges and prosecutors.55
According to G. Di Federico, who has extensively written on the 
issues of  judicial independence and role of  the Consiglio Superiore della 
Magistratura, there are four main areas in which the CSM’s powers have 
expanded.56
First, the CSM issues a set of  rules to be followed by the Presidents 
of  courts when drawing up management plans that, inter alia, lay down 
criteria for the assignment of  cases to individual judges.57
Secondly, the CSM’s powers have expanded in relation to the pro-
fessional training and education of  magistrates. This field has always been 
considered by the CSM as a necessary tool to promote judicial indepen-
dence. From the early 1990s, the CSM has progressively developed struc-
53 Art. 104, para 4 Const.
54 Art. 104, para 7 Const.
55 For further remarks, cf. R. Caponi, Judicial Independence in Italy – The Role of  the Consiglio Superiore della Magis-
tratura, p. 135 ff.
56 Cf. G. Di Federico, Judicial Independence in Italy, p. 362.
57 Cf. G. Di Federico, Judicial Independence in Italy, p. 362.
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tures for the planning and management of  programmes of  professional 
training and education.58 In 2012 these educational activities came to an 
end, as a new Superior School of  the Magistracy59 began functioning. Af-
ter an initial period of  tension between the Superior School of  the Magis-
tracy and the CSM, the situation seems to be improving.
Third, the CSM may express advisory opinions to the Minister of  
Justice on legislative bills dealing with the administration of  justice. Al-
though the opinions are addressed to the Minister of  Justice, they are in 
fact intended to influence parliamentarians.60
Finally, whenever the majority of  the CSM deems that criticism of  
the magistracy as a whole or some of  its members is unjustified or of-
fensive. The CSM formally issues an official statement of  reprimand as 
a means of  protecting the independence of  the judiciary and of  its indi-
vidual members.61
6. Judicial Independence v. Efficiency of  Judicial System in Italy?
a) Introductory Remarks
Turning to the relationships between efficiency and judicial inde-
pendence, one immediately meets with strong views in the Italian scholar-
ship. As G. Di Federico put it:
“The role of  the [Consiglio superiore della Magistratura] and the 
developments of  judicial governance in Italy seem fully to 
validate the worries frequently expressed in several countries 
with regard to the actual functioning of  national judicial councils 
composed of  a majority of  magistrates, namely that the value 
of  independence be used as a means to pursue the corporate 
interest of  magistrates to the detriment of  an effective balance 
between the values of  independence and accountability, a balance 
which is necessary for the proper and efficient functioning of  
the judicial system”.62
58  Cf. G. Di Federico, Judicial Independence in Italy, p. 363.
59 Decreto legislativo no. 26 of  2006.
60 Cf. G. Di Federico, Judicial Independence in Italy, p. 364.
61 Cf. G. Di Federico, Judicial Independence in Italy, p. 365.
62 Cf. G. Di Federico, Judicial Independence in Italy, p. 397.
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After reading Di Federico’s statement, it is worth asking: (a) whether 
the current poor performance of  the Italian civil justice is really due, in 
a significant way, to the lack of  substantial control over the professional 
performance and diligence of  Italian magistrates;63 (b) whether the 
real causes of  the excessive duration of  civil proceedings in Italy have 
finally been discovered; (c) whether the strong protection of  judicial 
independence in Italy has played a major role in causing the inefficiency 
of  the judicial system.
b) Empirical Assessment: The use of  Indicators
It has become a commonplace that the Italian system of  civil justice 
is inefficient, because of  the huge backlog of  cases and the delay of  ordi-
nary civil proceedings.64
To assess the current state of  affairs in Italy one has to use some 
indicators concerning the flow of  proceedings, clearance rates, disposition 
time, number of  judges, number of  lawyers, litigation rate, and so on. One 
should be well aware that using indicators (ingeneral and, inparticular, ina 
comparative perspective) is somewhat a risky business, as the researcher 
(especially the scholar in civil procedure working, so to speak, in a stand-
alone position) has no control over its methodological premises. However, 
one has somehow to step in, as the use of  indicators for evaluating and 
comparing the performance of  national judicial systems in a crosscountry 
perspective has spread at a remarkable pace since the beginning of  the 
XXIst century and is becoming a powerful tool of  global and European 
governance.65
c) The EU Justice Scoreboard
As an example of  this approach, consider the EU Justice Score-
63 Cf. also S. Chiarloni, Civil Justice and its Paradoxes: An Italian Perspective, p. 277: “The fact that judges are civil ser-
vants employed by the State had given rise in the past to certain problems typical of  a bureaucracy lacking a tradition of  
excellence and hard work”.
64 For the Italian reader: “ordinary proceedings” refers to all proceedings encompassing a cognizione piena, a plenary asses-
sment on the issues of  fact and law of  the dispute.
65 For further remarks on this point, s. R. Caponi, Doing business come scopo del processo civile?, Foro Italiano, 2015, V, 
c. 10 ff.; K.E. Davis, A. Fisher, B. Kingsbury, S.E. Merry, Governance by Indicators. Global Power through Quantification 
and Rankings, Oxford, OUP, 2012; S.E. Merry, The Quiet Power of  Indicators. Measuring Development Corruption and 
the Rule of  Law, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2015; R. Rottenburg, The World of  Indicators. The Making of  Governmental 
Knowledge through Quantification, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2015.
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board, published yearly (since 2013) by the European Commission.66 
According to its presentation, “the EU Justice Scoreboard is an infor-
mation tool aiming to assist the EU and Member States to achieve more 
effective justice by providing objective, reliable and comparable data on 
the quality, independence and efficiency of  justice systems in all Mem-
ber States”. As to the efficiency of  the justice systems, the EU Justice 
Scoreboard uses a number of  indicators: the length of  proceedings, the clear-
ance rate and the number of  pending cases. The length of  proceedings 
expresses the time (in days) taken by the court to reach a decision at 
first instance in ordinary proceedings. According to the European Com-
mission, “the efficiency of  a judicial system should already be reflected 
at first instance, as the first instance is an obligatory step for everyone 
going to court”. By saying that the EU Justice Scoreboard is not right 
as far as civil procedure in Italy is concerned. Ordinary proceedings are 
not the key instrument for ensuring judicial protection of  rights in Italy 
any longer. In fact, over the last decades, they are becoming less and less 
important, even residual, to that end.
In order to take a correct view of  the real state of  affairs in Italy, one 
should take into consideration a large number of  “special” proceedings 
(to use the Italian procedural Jargon), which normally enable claimants to 
obtain effective and efficient judicial protection of  rights in a wide range 
of  situations. As of  2013, the number of  cases brought to court by way of  
special proceedings (especially payment orders and provisional measures) 
was substantially higher than the number of  ordinary proceedings.67
At the stage, it is worth taking stock of  a few statistical data con-
cerning the number of  judges, the number of  civil cases in the courts 
of  first and second instance, the numbers of  lawyers, and the litigation 
rates in Italy, expanding the data base of  the EU Justice scoreboard, if  
necessary.
66 The Scoreboard uses different sources of  information. Most of  the quantitative data are currently provided by the 
CEPEJ, Report on European Judicial Systems, but the EU Commission draws upon additional sources of  information, 
e.g., Eurostat, World Bank, World Economic Forum, and the European judicial networks.
67 Ministero della giustizia, Piano della performance 2015–2017, p. 15; R. Caponi, A Masterpiece at a Glance; Piero Cala-
mandrei, Introduzione allo Studio Sistematico dei Provvedimenti Cautelari, in L. Cadiet, B. Hess, M. Requejo Isidro (eds.), 
Procedural Science at the Crossroads of  Different Generations, Studies of  the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for 
International, European and Regulatory Procedural Law, Nomos, 2015, p. 373–380.
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d) Number of  Judges
The number of  career magistrates, as fixed by statute68, amounts 
to 10,151: 6,379 judges, 2,157 prosecutors (among them, 150 are on tem-
porary leave of  absence to perform other duties, e.g. at the Ministry of  
Justice, and 354 are trainees). There are about 2,765 career judges dealing 
at first and second instance with civil cases.69
In addition to career magistrates, there is an even higher number of  
honorary magistrates.70 They have a legal education (mostly, they are prac-
titioners) and are managed by the CSM, but their status and remuneration 
is quite different from that of  career magistrates.71 There are several types 
of  honorary judges; among who mare those dealing more intensively with 
civil cases including 1,880 justices of  the peace, giudici di pace, (who also 
deal with small minor criminal offences),72 2,156 honorary judges in the 
courts of  general jurisdiction (tribunali), 117 honorary judges in the courts 
of  appeal, 1,096 honorary judges in the juvenile courts.73
e) Number of  Proceedings (Clearance Rate, Disposition Time)
It is worth relating the number of  judges dealing exclusively or 
mainly with civil cases (2,765 career judges, 1,880 justices of  the peace, 
2,156 honorary judges in the tribunali, and 117 honorary judges in the 
courts of  appeal) to the number of  civil cases before the courts of  first and 
second instance. The term “civil cases” refers to all ordinary proceedings 
(also dealing with labour related disputes, family matters, bankruptcy and 
insolvency, at first and second instance), summary proceedings (mainly 
68 Currently, Law no. 181 of  2008.
69 This number emerges a survey conducted in 2014 by the High Council of  the Judiciary, available online at www.csm.
it. In reality, the number of  career judges will be a little higher, as a few courts did not answer the questionnaire sent 
around by the CSM.
70 Art. 106, para 2 and 116 Const.
71 The trend towards the deployment of  an increasing number of  honorary judges is grounded in the need to reduce 
the costs of  the administration of  justice, but the differences of  status and pay between honorary and career judges has 
caused tensions that need to be tackled by the lawgiver (s. the draft law no. 1738 of  2015, currently pending in Parliament). 
Historical statistics, concerning the first decades of  the XXth century, show that the Italian justice system performed 
far better than today, when honorary judges were assigned the most of  civil disputes. Cf. A. Proto Pisani, Che fare della 
Magistratura onoraria?, Foro Italiano, 2015, V, c. 364.
72 For this number of  currently working justices of  the peace, s. Ministero della giustizia, Piano della performance 2015–
2017, p. 11.
73 These data are available online at www.csm.it.
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is suing payment orders and provisional measures), and enforcement 
proceedings, unless otherwise indicated.74
It is illuminating to examine the statistical data from 2013, provided 
by the Italian Ministry of  Justice.75
Concerning the justices of  the peace, there were some 1,372,421 
new cases, 1,415,020 resolved cases, and 1,296,075 pending cases at the 
end of  2013. Accordingly, the clearance rate amounted to 103, such that 
the backlog of  cases is decreasing. The average disposition time amounted 
to 334 days. The justices of  the peace resolved on average, circa 752 cases 
per capita (1,415,020 divided by 1,880), without distinguishing between 
ordinary proceedings and special proceedings (mainly payment orders).
In the ordinary courts of  general jurisdiction (tribunali), there 
were 2,813,068 new lodgements, 2,899,247 resolved cases, and 3,265,875 
pending cases at the end of  2013. Accordingly, the clearance rate amounted 
to 103. The average disposition time taking into account only the bulk of  
ordinary proceedings (ordinary proceedings, proceedings regarding labour 
disputes, and proceedings regarding social security benefits) amounted to 
923 days (1,837,540 pending cases at the end of  2013, divided by 726,638 
resolved cases, and the result multiplied by 365).76
In the courts of  appeal, there were 123,241 new cases, 164,577 re-
solved cases, and 397,536 pending cases at the end of  2013. Accordingly, 
the clearance rate amounted to 133, such that the backlog of  cases in the 
courts of  appeal is substantially decreasing.77 The average disposition time 
amounted to 881 days.
f) Ratio Judges/Resolved Cases
Career judges as well as lay judges in the tribunali and in the courts 
74 For detailed statistics concerning the different types of  proceedings, s. Ministero della giustizia, Piano della performance 
2015–2017, p. 15.
75 Cf. Ministero della giustizia, Piano della performance 2015–2017, p. 15.
76 For these more detailed data on ordinary proceedings, s. Ministero della giustizia, Piano della performance 2015–
2017, p. 15.
77 This clearance rate is certainly above average and may be at least partially due to the introduction in 2012 of  a sum-
mary proceedings leading to the reject of  appeal if  there is no “reasonable prospect of  success” (new Art. 348–bis c.p.c., 
introduced by the law no. 134 of  2012). On this aspect, s. R. Caponi, Italian Civil Justice System: Most Significant Innova-
tions in the Last Years (2009–2012), in O.G. Chase, E. Hershkoff, L. Silberman, Y. Taniguchi, V. Varano, A. Zuckerman 
(eds.), Civil Litigation Comparative Context, Thomson West, Supplement 2012, www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/
ECM_PRO_074529.pdf, p.136ff., p.137ff.
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of  appeals (2,765 career judges, 2,156 honorary judges in the tribunali, 
117 honorary judges in the courts of  appeal) disposed of  an average of  
176 ordinary proceedings per capita in 2013 (726,638 resolved cases in 
the tribunali, 164,577 resolved cases in the courts of  appeal).78 To this 
number one should add, as far as the tribunali are concerned: bankruptcy 
proceedings, proceedings in family matters, executory proceedings, special 
proceedings (mainly payment orders and provisional measures).
g) Backlog of  Cases
Finally, examining all adjudicating bodies (justices of  the peace, tri-
bunali, courts of  appeal, Corte di cassazione) as well as all civil cases, there 
were some 4,388,591 new proceedings initiated, 4,569,332 resolved cases, 
and 5,155,010 pending cases at the end of  2013 (with a 4 % decrease of  
backlogs, compared to 2012). The number of  pending cases at the end of  
year has been steadily decreasing in the last 4 years, with an average de-
crease of  some 5 % per year. Of  course, strictly speaking not all pending 
cases are delayed, because one has to subtract from the amount pending 
cases those whose duration is no longer than the “reasonable” length.79
h) Interim Findings
In the light of  these statistics, it is submitted that Di Federico’s criti-
cism is ex cessive, as far as the average performance of  Italian judges is 
concerned. This does not seem to play a key role in causing the unrea-
sonable length of  ordinary civil proceedings. This finding is confirmed 
by the 2015 EU Justice Scoreboard (source CEPEJ Report), where one 
can find that the Italian rate of  resolving litigious civil and commercial 
cases at first instance (clearance rate) is the second best in Europe (after 
Luxembourg).80
78 As to the cases resolved/judges’ ratio I could not distinguish between courts in first and second instance, because I had 
at my disposal only the aggregate number of  2,765 career judges dealing with civil cases in the tribunali and corti di appello.
79 The problem of  assessing the reasonable length of  plenary civil proceedings in Italy cannot be addressed here. At 
any rate, the level of  delay has become clearly unreasonable in many cases in Italy, giving rise to many complaints to 
the European Court of  Human Rights for violation of  Art. 6, para 1 ECHR. To curb the number of  complaints to the 
European Court, a law was passed in 2001 (law no. 89 of  2001) and amended in 2012 and 2013. It entitles those who 
suffered damages from the undue delay of  proceedings to claim for money compensation. It should be kept in mind that 
the compensation may be claimed only when the duration of  proceedings is over three years (in first instance).
80 Cf. 2015 EU Justice Scoreboard, p. 10, figure no. 8, where one can find the clearance rates of  2010, 2012, 2013. The 
extraordinary good performance in 2012 can however be explained rather by a significant decrease in the number of  
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i) Litigation Rate
In order to further inquire into the reasons for the unreasonable 
length of  ordinary civil proceedings in Italy, it is worth recalling that the 
number of  first instance incoming litigious cases per 100,000 inhabitants 
amounted to 2,613 in 2012.81 That is a litigation rate higher than in Ger-
many (1,961), UK (1,859) and Austria (1,235), lower than in Spain (3,828) 
and Greece (5,834, which is extraordinarily high compared to all others 
European countries), and similar to France (2,575). The Italian litigation 
rate, compared to that of  similarly positioned European countries, is half  
as high.82
This finding as to Italy might be rather a consequence than a cause 
of  the undue delay of  civil proceedings, as debtors who are unwilling 
to fulfil their obligations can to some extent rely on the duration of  
proceedings and are comfortable with facing lawsuits.83
j) Lawyers
As the litigation rate is not particularly high in Italy, one has to 
downgrade a little the role of  the high number of  lawyers as a key com-
ponent in the inefficiency of  civil proceedings. Of  course, this is not to 
say that the number of  lawyers is insignificant in this context. Although 
a selfregulated body, the legal profession has not been very successful in 
controlling admissions. As of  2012, Italy has the third highest number 
of  lawyers among the countries of  the Council of  Europe: 226,222, that 
amounts to circa 379 per 100,000 inhabitants84 (in Germany they are 200 
per 100,000 inhabitants, in France 85, in Greece 380, in Spain 285, in 
incoming cases, particularly in the years 2010 and 2011, due both to the increase of  court taxes that litigants are required 
to pay to initiate the proceedings, and the Italian Mediation Act 2010 (decreto legislativo no. 28 of  2010), which provides 
that mediation has compulsory to be sought prior to the commencement of  proceedings in a significant number of  dis-
putes. For further remarks on this point, s. R. Caponi, Italian Civil Justice System: Most Significant Innovations in the Last 
Years (2009– 2012), in: O.G. Chase, E. Hershkoff, L. Silberman, Y. Taniguchi, V. Varano, A. Zuckerman (eds.), 2012, p. 
137 ff.; G. Pailli, N. Trocker, Italy’s New Law on Mediation in Civil and Com mercial Matters, ZZPInt, 18 (2013), p. 75ff.
81 Cf. CEPEJ, Report on European Judicial Systems, p. 202, table 9.4.
82 For an inquiry into the causes of  litigation in Italy, dating back to the 1990’s but still useful, s. S. Pellegrini, La litigiosità 
in Italia, Giuffrè, 1997.
83 On this point s. D. Marchesi, Litiganti, avvocati e magistratura, Il Mulino, 2003,p. 71 ff.: “pathological component of  
civil justice demand”.
84 CEPEJ, Report on European Judicial Systems, p. 377, table 12.1. The highest number of  lawyers is in Luxembourg; 
the second highest is in Greece.
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Austria 93). Apart from a lucky minority of  specialists in such fields as 
business law and administrative law, most lawyers must make what income 
they can out of  handling large numbers of  cases in low value fields, such 
as caraccidents, credit recovery and labour cases.85
As Trocker put it:
“The pursuit of  sources of  income contributes to the judicial 
burden, favours futile controversies and makes lawyers turn into 
a stimulus to litigation instead of  a restraint over it”.86
The work practices of  law firms enable lawyers to handle such a 
large numbers of  cases.
As Chiarloni put it:
“Insuch hierarchically structured firms, a chief  with manage-
rial and representative functions supervises the work of  a lar-
ge number of  employees. The lower level employees are often 
beginners, employedat the level that their talents allow. Some 
apprentices carry out jurisprudential and doctrinal research, 
others carry papers to and from the court. The present slow 
procedures allow practitioners to manage an increasing caseload 
while keeping the same number of  employees. Most work can 
be performed in the office. Thanks to postponements, work can 
be scheduled in order to allow the most cost effective employ-
ment of  staff ”.87
k) Structure of  Proceedings
The work practices described by Chiarloni are also adopted by 
medium and small sized law firms, which make up the bulk of  the legal 
profession in Italy. The reference made to “postponements” synchronises 
work practices with the structure of  ordinary civil proceedings.88 The civil 
procedure of  Italy, as well as those of  other countries belonging to the 
85 M. De Cristofaro, N. Trocker (eds.), Civil Justice in Italy, p. 49.
86 M. De Cristofaro, N. Trocker (eds.), Civil Justice in Italy, p. 49.
87 Cf. S. Chiarloni, Civil Justice and its Paradoxes: An Italian Perspective, p. 267.
88 Cf. R. Caponi, Zur Struktur des italienischen Zivilprozesses, Festschrift für Rolf  Stürner zum 70. Geburtstag, Mohr 
Siebeck, 2014, p. 1455 ff.
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Romance legal family (such as France, South American countries and, 
until the new code of  civil procedure of  2000, Spain) originates from the 
Italian canonical procedure. Based on this model, a procedural model with 
three different stages has developed: the written introductory phase (made 
up of  the statement of  claim, defendant’s response, and the exchange of  
a number of  briefs between the parties); the fact finding phase (made up 
of  the taking of  evidence by the instructing judge); and the final decision 
phase, where the decision on the dispute is to be issued by the instructing 
judge (or a judicial panel in certain cases)89, after the parties have been given 
the opportunity to exchange their final briefs. The fact finding phase often 
requires several hearings for the evidence to be compiled. This model is 
characterized by a sequence of  hearings and not by a concentrated main 
hearing, such as in Gerany, England and (after the new Code of  Civil 
Procedure, enacted in 2000) in Spain.90
This structure of  proceedings not only enables law firms to 
organise their work for a significant amount of  pending cases, but also 
makes it possible for most judges to handle their heavy workload. In these 
conditions, they are more comfortable with a number of  hearings (where 
very little advances), postponements centred on a mostly written handling 
of  the case by the parties, and a final examination of  written submissions 
by the judge, rather than with proceedings centred on a labour intense 
main hearing.
In conclusion, the current structure of  ordinary proceedings coin-
cides with the interests of  law firms and the bureaucratic spirit of  many 
judges rather than with the public interest in the timely administration of  
justice.
l) Backlog as a Leading Cause of  Undue Delay
The preceding remarks make it possible to claim that the huge 
workload (and backlog) of  the courts plays the leading role in determining 
the undue delay of  ordinary civil proceedings and making it difficult 
to implement procedural reforms aiming to change the structure of  
proceeding and introducing a proceeding centred on a main hearing. 
89 For these cases, s. Art. 50–bis c.p.c.
90 For this comparison, s. R. Stürner, The Principles of  Transnational Civil Procedure. An Introduction to Their Basic 
Conceptions, RabelsZ, 69 (2005), p. 201 ff., p. 223.
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Against this background one can scrutinise the two competing narratives 
in western countries concerning the civil justice: that there is not enough 
access to justice and that there is too much litigation.91 However, it would 
not be fair to say that there is “too much” litigation in Italy (and possibly 
in any other jurisdiction) just as it would not be fair to say that there are 
too many sick people or too many people who want to make use of  public 
transport. Rather, there are only governments which are unable to place 
courts, hospitals, and public transport companies in a condition to perform 
their duties and to cope with their caseloads, patients and passengers. To 
eliminate the imbalances between the supply of  and demand for public 
services, governments can both increase supply, if  there are resources 
to do so, and they can from a longterm perspective adopt measures in 
order to mitigate the human, cultural, social and economic conditions 
that increase litigation before the courts, illness and so on. This is for the 
politics to decide. Indeed:
“The inability of  the politics to remedy the intolerable 
inefficiency of  the justice system has been one of  the most 
discouraging aspects of  Italy’s recent history”.92
The huge workload of  courts is primarily due to the fact that for 
decades the ratio of  the number of  judges to the number of  civil cases 
to be decided has been unfavourable. There are too few judges in relation 
to the disputes to be resolved. The number of  career judges per 100,000 
inhabitants in Italy is lower than that of  the most European countries 
(Italy 10.6; Germany 24; France, 10.7; Spain 11.2; Austria 18.3; Greece 
23.3).93 The ratio of  honorary judges to 100,000 in habitants is even more 
unfavourable (Italy 5.5; Germany 122.3; France 38.0; Spain, 16.7; Austria 
N/A, Greece N/A). Low number of  judges and relative high litigation 
rate, half  that of  comparators, creates the huge workload of  courts. The 
indifference and the inability of  politicians to tackle this problem in a 
timely manner has contributed to the increase of  the backlog of  cases 
pending before the courts. As of  2013, the number of  pending cases 
91 Cf. H. Genn, Judging Civil Justice, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010, p. 78.
92 Cf. P. Ginsborg, L’Italia del tempo presente. Famiglia società civile stato: 1980 – 1996, Torino, Einaudi, 1998, p. 435 ff., 
p. 562 f.; S. Chiarloni, Civil Justice and its Paradoxes: An Italian Perspective, p. 401 ff.
93 CEPEJ, Report on European Judicial Systems, p. 155, table 7.1.
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before the courts of  first instance amounted to 1,296,075, before the 
Justice of  the Peace and 3,265,875 before the tribunali.94
m) Heads of  Court and Managerial Skills
The managerial skills needed to lead the courts also are of  concern 
in this context. Heads of  courts are appointed by the High Council of  the 
Judiciary often without paying enough attention to their managerial skills. 
This problem is linked to the composition of  the Consiglio Superiore della 
Magistratura.
As to the elections of  career magistrates to the CSM (who make up 
two thirds of  the Council), a major problem is that the electoral system is 
not able to avoid the influence of  various factions at the Magistracy who 
influence the list of  candidates and the activities of  the magistrates once 
elected as CSM members. As a consequence, a number of  CSM deci-
sions on the status of  magistrates are challenged by magistrates before 
the administrative courts. The relatively high number of  appeals might 
correspond to a widespread sense among magistrates that the decisions of  
the CSM are not always based on merit but may be influenced by the role 
played by CMS members, representing particular factions, in support of  
magistrates of  the same faction.95
n) Professional Evaluations of  Magistrates: Open Issues
As to the professional evaluations and promotions of  magistrates, 
until the mid 1960s career advancement in the judiciary was based on 
evaluations by senior judges, who were expected to evaluate the written 
judicial opinions of  their younger colleagues. Following a number of  
statutes enacted between 1966 and 1979, this system has undergone a 
radical change. As a consequence, promotions have been based largely on 
seniority of  service. Promotion to a higher position means the judge is 
entitled but not obliged to perform the higher level functions. Therefore, 
a judge may gain the status and the salary of  an appellate court judge, but 
is permitted to continue and serve as a judge of  first instance if  he or 
she so wishes. As a consequence, a couple of  thousand judges enjoy the 
94 Cf. Ministero della giustizia, Piano della performance 2015–2017, p. 15.
95 Cf. G. Di Federico, Judicial Independence in Italy, p. 361.
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status and the salary of  judges of  Cassazione. These changes have certainly 
fostered the independence of  judges. On the other hand, it has been 
acknowl edged that the peculiar relationship which over the past 40 years 
or so has been created between promotion, professional evaluation and 
career is unsatisfactory. In fact, it is quite uncommon for a judge not to 
be promoted or to be dismissed from office for inability or incompetence 
prior to the age of  mandatory retirement.
Professional evaluations and promotions are now regulated by a new 
law.96 Magistrates are evaluated several times in the course of  their career 
with reference to four aspects of  their performance: capacity, productivity, 
diligence, and motivation. The new law is aimed at making the conditions 
of  professional evaluations and promotions more stringent. An analysis 
of  the decisions of  the CSM under the new regulation shows that all the 
magistrates that were evaluated were regularly promoted.97
Fixing performance targets is an open issue also in Italy.98
V. COURT SPECIALIzATION
1. Review of  Administrative Action: A Glimpse of  Legal History
The attitude of  the Italian legal system to court specialization is 
rather complex and ambiguous. It cannot be explained without remarking 
on the history concerning the judicial protection of  individuals against the 
action of  the public administration, as this was the first way the question 
of  court specialization emerged after the unification of  Italy in 1861.
An attempt to concentrate the review of  administrative action be-
fore ordinary courts had been enacted by law no. 2248 of  1865,99 but in 
the subsequent decades it turned out to be incapable of  ensuring judicial 
protection in some major situations. As a consequence, a new (fourth) sec-
tion was added in 1889 to the Council of  State (Consiglio di Stato),100 with 
96 Decreto legislativo no. 160/2006.
97 Cf. G. Di Federico, Judicial Independence in Italy, p. 374.
98 Cf. R. Fuzio, La misura del lavoro del magistrato tra standard e carichi esigibili – Problema nuovo? A che punto siamo 
(Nota a Consiglio sup. magistratura, 23 settembre 2015 e Consiglio sup. magistratura, 23 luglio 2014), Foro Italiano, 2016, 
III, p. 58.
99 Cf. Law 20 March 1865, no. 2248, Attachment E, Abolizione del contenzioso amministrativo.
100 Based on the French model of  the Conseil d’État, the Consiglio di Stato is the main legal and administrative advisory 
body to the government administration.
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the task of  adjudicating on challenges of  acts of  the public administration 
filed by individuals or legal persons pleading a violation of  “interests”. 
That move laid the foundation of  a dual system of  judicial review of  the 
administrative action: ordinary civil courts had jurisdiction over violation 
of  “subjective rights” (diritti soggettivi), while administrative courts had ju-
risdiction over violation of  “legitimate interests” (interessi legittimi).
2. Ordinary Courts and “Special” Courts: Constitutional Framework
In the course of  the preparatory works for the Constitution 
(1946–1947), the idea of  establishing a single ordinary court system 
was taken into consideration,101 by abolishing the administrative courts’ 
jurisdiction to adjudicate and devolving challenges to the acts of  the public 
administration to the ordinary courts. This reform proposal was strongly 
supported by Piero Calamandrei, who a quarter of  a century before had 
published “La Cassazione civile” (1920), where he had made a strong point 
about the Supreme Court as a fundamental adjudicating body committed 
to ensure the uniform application of  law.
In the end the proposal did not gain the approval by the Constitu-
ent Assembly, but the contrasting opinions had an impact on the text of  
the Constitution, causing, in truth, inconsistencies in its text. The Consti-
tution declares that (a) the judicial function must be exercised exclusively 
by ordinary judges appointed and governed by the rules of  judicial or-
ganisation (ordinamento giudiziario); whereas (b) extraordinary or specialized 
(“special” in the Italian terminology) courts shall not be established, while 
the need to set up specialized adjudicating bodies shall be satisfied only 
by establishing specialized sections for specific subject matter within or-
dinary courts, wherein qualified citizen not belonging to the judiciary may 
participate (layjudges).102
If  one read no further one could argue convincingly that the Italian 
constitution provides for a single ordinary court system, but the subse-
quent Art. 103, para no. 1 Const. belies this picture, giving the Council 
of  State and other organs of  administrative justice jurisdiction to pro-
tect legitimate interests and, in specific matters indicated by law, subjective 
101 For references on this point, s. P. Comoglio, Il giudice specializzato in materia di impresa, Torino, Giappichelli, 2014, p. 16.
102 Art. 102 Const.
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rights against the public administration.103 Moreover, the sixth transitional 
provision of  the Constitution required that within five years special ju-
risdictional bodies still existing at the time of  entering into force of  the 
Constitution shall be reformed in accordance with the Constitution.104
3. The Current Situation
Asa consequence of  this perplexing approach, the Italian judicial 
system retains the distinction between ordinary and specialized courts, al-
though specialised courts are not formally differentiated like, for example, 
in the German legal system (in particular, labour and social welfare dis-
putes are brought before the ordinary courts). Currently, ordinary courts 
(Giudice di pace and Tribunale at first instance, Corte di appello at second in-
stance; Corte di Cassazione as Supreme Court) administer justice in civil and 
criminal matters, other than those for which the Constitution105 or statu-
tory regulations106 require a specialized court.
Among the specialized courts, the administrative courts are the 
most important.107 Since 1971, they also have become more differentiated 
by way of  the establishment of  the Tribunali amministrativi regionali. In 
the last decades, the grey area linked to the distinction between rights 
and legitimate interests has encouraged the legislator to vest “exclusive” 
(i.e. irrespective of  this distinction) subject matter jurisdiction in single 
administrative matters in the administrative courts in an increasing 
number of  cases.108 This trend is very questionable in terms of  its 
103 Moreover, “judicial protection of  rights and legitimate interests against acts of  the public administration must always 
be admitted before the courts of  ordinary or administrative jurisdiction. Such judicial protection cannot be abolished or 
limited to specified categories of  acts or to particular means of  challenging” (Art. 113 Const.).
104 In this way, for example, tax courts (commissioni tributarie) still exist today. Cf. Decreto legislativo no. 54 of  1992. Besi-
des the tax courts, further specialized courts render justice in military matters, and other minor matters.
105 Cf. the already mentioned Art. 103 Const.
106 Cf. the already mentioned Transitional and Final Provision of  the Constitution, no. V. 
107 To complete the picture of  special courts, the Constitution provides for the Court of  Accounts (Corte dei conti) both 
as a body in charge of  the preventive checking of  the legality of  government acts and ex post auditing of  the management 
of  the State budget, and, as an adjudicating body, vested with jurisdiction “over matters of  public accounting and such 
other questions as are specified by law”. Art. 103, para 2 Const. Art. 11 of  the Law no. 15 of  2009 has redesigned the 
government body of  the Court – the so called Consiglio di Presidenza della Corte dei Conti – placing on an equal footing the 
judicial and the lay (appointed by the Parliament) components of  the body. For further analysis of  the role played by the 
Corte deiConti, s. M. De Cristofaro, N. Trocker (eds.), Civil Justice in Italy, p. 28 f.
108 For the listing of  these matters, see Art. 133 Code of  Administrative Judicial Proceedings (D. Lgs. No. 104 of  2010). 
O.G. Chase, E. Hershkoff, L. Silberman, Y. Taniguchi, V. Varano, A. Zuckerman (eds.), Civil Litigation in Comparative Context, 
Thomson West, 2007, p. 123 f.; M. De Cristofaro, N. Trocker (eds.), Civil Justice in Italy, p. 27.
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compliance with the Constitution,109 because the above mentioned Art. 
103, para no. 1 Const. states that the Council of  State and other organs of  
administrative justice have jurisdiction to protect subjective rights against 
the public administration, only “in specific matters” indicated by law. 
Examining the matters devoted to the administrative courts’ “exclusive” 
subject matter jurisdiction, which are today listed in Art. 133 Code of  
Administrative Judicial Proceedings, they are anything but specific: 
disputes about agreements between citizens and public administration 
amending or replacing administrative measures, the right of  access to 
administrative documents, breach of  the duty of  transparency, granting 
of  the use of  public goods, public services, procurement, urban planning 
and construction policy, challenging therulings of  independent agencies, 
and so on.
Moreover, this trend broadens the scope of  the administrative 
courts’ subject matter jurisdiction, which aggravates the existing problems 
regarding the composition of  the Council of  State, as its members nor-
mally act also as consultants of  the public administration and hold im-
portant positions in ministries, such as heads of  legislative offices, heads 
of  the ministerial staff, and so on. Italian narratives directed to a foreign 
readership110 point out that in Italy “as a result of  a wellk nown histori-
cal development, administrative courts have affirmed themselves as truly 
independent bodies, end owed with realcourts’prestige and maintaining 
fundamental standards of  procedural fairness”111. This may well be true, 
although it is somewhat a mystery how the dual role of  the Council of  
State’s members (as both consultants of  the government and judges in the 
disputes between citizens and public administration) is to be reconciled 
with the requirement of  independence. We might recall that legal provi-
sions and bodies in charge of  ensuring judicial independence differ greatly 
in the Italian legal system between ordinary and specialized courts, as the 
independence of  the former is ensured by the High Council of  the Judi-
ciary (Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura), while the independence of  the 
latter is regulated by different statutory provisions.112
109 Certain legal provisions belonging to this trend were indeed invalidated by the Constitutional Court no. 204 of  2004, 
although its overall reasoning is quite unsatisfactory.
110 Cf. M. De Cristofaro, N. Trocker (eds.), Civil Justice in Italy, p. 19.
111 Now codified by the Decreto legislativo, 2 July 2010, no. 104, Code of  Administrative Judicial Proceedings.
112 Cf. Art. 108, para 2 Const. As to this kind of  statutory provisions, consider for example Law no. 186 of  1982.
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In the current scholarly discussion in Italy the proposal to establish 
a single ordinary courts system is once again gaining traction.113
Turning to the relationship between court specialization and effi-
ciency, attention should be drawn to the specialized sections of  ordinary 
courts. As the Constitution of  1948 banned the creation of  new special 
courts, the need for a degree of  expertise in certain matters ought to be 
satisfied by the establishment of  specialized sections within the ordinary 
courts (e.g., specialized agricultural sections, juvenile courts).114
A new turn in the history of  specialized courts is the establishment 
of  “enterprises” courts in 2012, but an indepth analysis of  this novelty 
should remain for another day.115
113 Cf., among others, A. Proto Pisani, L’importanza dell’articolo 113, 3° comma Costituzione, per una giustizia effettiva 
del cittadino contro atti della Pubblica amministrazione, in Questione giustizia, 2015, p. 149ff.
114 M. De Cristofaro, N. Trocker (eds.), Civil Justice in Italy, p. 40.
115 Cf. Law no. 27 of  2012. Cf. P. Comoglio, Il giudice specializzato in materia di impresa.
